I didn't find a story or diary on this Harper's article, available on line
here.
In it, Dr. Emile A. Nakhleh, recently retired Director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program for the CIA, answers questions posed to him by Ken Silverstein.
The questions and answers, excerpts of a few of which I reproduce below, go straight to the heart of what U.S. intelligence knew before the war about Iraq's supposed links to al-Qaeda. This is the clearest statement yet from an insider that Bush-Cheney knowingly lied as part of a conspiracy to commit aggression.
He also has a few choice words to say about Guantanamo, detention policy, the stupidity of the confrontation with Iran, and why our presence in Iraq is making the situation worse, not better, and must end now.
It's well worth a look. Read it and weep about what could have been, had grown-ups been in charge.
1. In the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, administration officials claimed that Saddam Hussein's regime had links to terrorist organizations including Al Qaeda. What was your view on that question?
We had no evidence that there was a Saddam-bin Laden axis....
[snip]
People at the CIA didn't believe there were links between Iraq and Al Qaeda. The source for much of the information of that sort was Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress, and their positions jibed with the positions of those in the administration who wanted to wage war in Iraq--Wolfowitz, Feith, people in the vice president's office. So they relied heavily on that reporting, but there was never any evidence to support that link.
[snip]
3. You traveled to Guantanamo in 2002. Were you surprised by what you saw there?
I spent hours talking with prisoners about why they had become jihadists and how they came to Guantanamo. [snip] Even the command down there knew that probably one-third of the prisoners were neither terrorists nor jihadists, and wouldn't have been there if we weren't paying a bounty to Pakistani security forces for every Middle Eastern-looking person they handed over to us. [snip] Unfortunately, we treated everyone the same, which led the non-jihadists at Guantanamo to hate us as much as the rest, becoming more hardened in their attitudes toward the US and more disappointed in the American sense of fairness and justice.
4. What should the United States do in Iraq now?
I have come to believe that our presence is part of the problem and that we should begin to seriously devise an exit strategy. There's a civil war in Iraq and our presence is contributing to the violence. We've become a lightning rod--we're not restricting the violence, we're contributing to it. [snip] We need to get out of there. [snip]
[snip]
7. And an extra question--Iran is another major conundrum for policymakers. How should the United States proceed in formulating an Iran policy?
The conflict in post-Saddam Iraq, the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war, and the Shiite empowerment and revival across the region have clearly demonstrated Iran's standing as a regional power with influence beyond its borders. Whether we like it or not, we would do well to begin to explore creative ways to engage Iran and bring Iran and Shiite politics to the forefront of our policy in the region. For decades, the US has based its policy and interests in the greater Middle region on close relations with Sunni Arab, authoritarian regimes in the name of fighting Communism during the cold war and terrorism since 9/11. We coddled many of those regimes for the sake of regional stability and catered to their "fears" about the Shiites. Iran is a large country with a vibrant civil society, rich history and culture, and well-established political traditions. I think it would be detrimental to our long-term interests to ignore the Iranian reality and let ourselves be blinded by our dislike for the current president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. [snip] Iran's nuclear issue is as much a failure of the nonproliferation approach as it is one of belligerence. Here too, I think, creative policies of engagement are called for and are possible.